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Abstract: 
This article presents the thoughts of  Michel Foucault, a cultural historian, 
philosopher, and intellectual, who brilliantly analyses the historical events 
of  the past as creative criticisms for shaping human attitudes today. 
Through this historical analysis, Foucault examines the ways in which 
subjects were formed from classical times to the present. Foucault sees 
how this process takes a long time, starting from the subject as formed 
through various discourses to the subject as forming itself. To arrive 
at the latter, Foucault brings his readers to the classical Greco-Roman 
era to see how humans live their freedom and responsibilities. He also 
shows them various practices of  the self  through meditation and inner 
examination, as well as the practice of  telling the truth (parrhesia) to 
oneself  and to others. All this in the era was known as ethics and also 
seen as a practice of  freedom. For Foucault, life must always be seen as 
a work of  art that requires the attention of  the artist from time to time 
in order to arrive at an art level considered useful and valuable to many 
people. Foucault calls this an aesthetic of  existence, where life is not 
merely seen as something given, but also that must always be fought for 
creatively from day to day. Life must be seen as an unstable condition in 
which there are always cracks, therefore it has to be fixed from time to 
time. This is what Foucault calls a model of  human existence.
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Introduction
Michel Foucault, a 20th century intellectual and thinker, whose 
name was closely attached to Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980), a French 
atheistic existentialist thinker, was born on October 15, 1926 in Poitiers, 
France, and died untimely on June 2, 1984.2 He was a specialist in many 
fields of  study and therefore, he is known as a historian, a philosopher, a 
sociologist, a psychologist and psychoanalyst, a penologist and an expert 
in the study of  criminology, a politician, an expert in archaeology, etc. 
Because of  this, in libraries his name can be found in different sections 
according to his expertise. Besides, he was internationally known as an 
expert of  the history of  the system of  thought. He was also a visiting 
professor in many countries around the world. 
His originality in philosophical thought invites various discussions 
and polemics, as it raises a lot of  controversies in the history of  philosophy. 
Controversy arises not only in the realm of  thought, in that his logic is 
completely different from the modern thinking claimed by Descartes, 
the father of  modern philosophy, but also on the fact that many of  his 
interpreters doubt of  many historical facts that he uses in many of  his 
works.3 
Modernist thought is mainly based in reason, subject, consciousness, 
essence, transcendence, foundation, human nature, etc, which, according 
to Foucault and postmodernist thinkers, neglects many other aspects of  
human life, such as unconsciousness, memory, imagination, historical and 
cultural backgrounds, and all other aspects that could be categorized as 
pluralism, human varieties, diversities, etc. This way of  thinking has been 
then planted deeply in the human unconscious from one generation to 
another and has become pattern of  thinking, expressed in the pattern 
of  speaking and behaving. All other aspects which were outside of  the 
rational subject or consciousness were considered irrational, unthinkable, 
illusive, magic, etc. Thus, Foucault was labeled by some as an irrational or 
anti-humanistic thinker.4
The next controversy is concerned with the accuracy of  the 
historical objective truths that appear in his many works. Several historians 
doubt the accuracy of  his information about certain events in European 
cultures, classical Greco-Roman customs and beliefs, political and cultural 
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habits, etc. Moreover, the controversy also emerged about his last two 
volumes of  The History of  Sexuality (The Use of  Pleasure and The Care of  the 
Self) which do not treat all information about sexuality, as historians might 
have generally thought, but emphasizes rather the notion of  subjectivity 
and the practice of  freedom.5
Despite all the controversies emerging out of  his works, we should 
be fair to Foucault’s intellectual journey from his early works to his last 
published pieces. Foucault is known as willfully anti-systematic, and 
therefore many readers find difficulties in reading his works.6 The difficulty 
in reading him concerns on the one hand the fact that his work has attracted 
the attention of  various linguistic and academic communities, and on the 
other that he has a powerful and genuine originality of  thought. Moreover, 
he has an ample vision, a highly disciplined and coherent one,that makes 
his work sui generis, as Bernauer claims in his book.7 However, if  we read 
through all his last seminars, interviews, and lectures at the Collège de 
Françe sometime before his death, we realize where Foucault began and 
where he ended up his intellectual journey.
Intellectual Journey: Subjectivity Seen in Foucault’s Early Works
In spite of  his unsystematic ways of  putting things together, 
through his many interviews and seminars as well as his many courses 
delivered at the Collège de Françe shortly before his death, the readers can 
easily locate his thought process. In his early works Foucault concentrates 
on historical facts that were to him hidden or being forgotten in the 
history of  consciousness. He picks them up and looks at them seriously. 
Though all these historical facts are forgotten, yet they are on the surface 
of  human experience. Let us say, for example, that sickness and illness, 
the mentally ill, the delinquent, and the like, were seen as people who had 
no value and were not useful for society, and therefore were of  no use 
to be taken care of. Those people and all their situations Foucault calls 
“madness” (la folie) in his thought process. 
Let us see closely his piece on leprosy written in Folie et deraison: 
histoire de la folie a l’âge classique.8 Those who suffered from leprosy were 
regarded  as dangerous and the disease was very dangerous and contagious. 
In Christian teaching at the time, leprosy was a sign of  God’s anger and 
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punishment. They therefore should be removed from family members 
and from society. Later on in other periods of  time, they were gathered 
and brought home, and for them were prepared hospitals (l’hopital general) 
to take care of  them and to cure them. In a later period of  time, the 
Christian teaching changed so that the lepers were seen as the people of  
God, and therefore, helping them would be beneficial with a lot of  grace. 
This enhanced Christians’ desire to help them. 
There were of  course causes of  the disease and therefore people 
had to take care of  sanitation in all aspects of  life, including the surrounding 
environment. People did not only take curative action for the sick but also 
preventive action. Then, education and health facilities were prepared by 
society for the well-being of  its citizens. Nowadays we see many doctors 
with their various specialties and expertise serving various hospitals for 
different diseases. Here we see how the government took action politically 
to help all citizens.
Here we also see that those who were sick were not well aware 
of  their disease. The healthy, normal ones looked at them as sick and 
abnormal; hence they had to be normalized. The venues they took to help 
these sick people were in accord with normal thinking. These suffering 
people were treated as objects to be acted upon. They were objectified. 
And so were the many mechanisms of  helping them. However, it is 
interesting to notice that the sick persons were also aware of  themselves 
as subjects, as they were well treated. In this sense they also felt important. 
It was useful to see how the madmen were made subjects in such a relation 
of  power.
Interesting also to note here is the influence of  Nietzsche on 
Foucault, who picked up the surface of  certain experiences and made it 
intelligible in order to be thought of  by mankind. Therefore, all treatments 
on madmen were seen as the progress of  human thought in terms of  what 
kind of  treatments should be taken in different eras of  thought. As expert 
in the history of  the systems of  thought, Foucault is highly interested in 
this matter rather than the accuracy of  the historical information. In other 
words, the historical facts might be wrong on one or several occasions, yet 
the more crucial thing was the movement of  human thought on certain 
special issues. All the above mentioned historical information justifies that 
each era of  thought has its own way of  thinking and behaving towards 
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certain issues. In other words, people in those different eras of  thought 
have some episteme which shows that they have certain knowledge of  
what they are experiencing.9
Foucault’s Subjectivity in His Axis of  Power
Foucault’s next axis of  thought is power. There he tells us about 
delinquency and the people involved in criminality, who should be 
confined in prisons. This appeared in his Discipline and Punish, and the 
deployment of  sexuality, which is found in the History of  Sexuality, volume 
1.10 These two different discourses, namely on prison and on sexuality, 
were certainly two different ways of  showing his second theme, that was 
power. The first discourse was centralized on the issue of  criminals, on 
how the delinquents and the criminals were treated from the beginning of  
the 17th century to the 18th century. They were at first treated not as human 
beings and were tortured vehemently and could even be killed instantly, 
depending on the type of  criminality they were involved in. Later on, they 
were treated mildly and more humanely as people thought about them 
quite differently. Then, they would be going through court, be examined, 
and so on, according to the procedures of  law. They were probably put 
into prison and stayed there temporarily, depending on their charge. They 
were confined in close spaces in order that they become aware of  their 
faults, and to escape from many other threats coming from their victims 
and their families. While they were in prison, they had to obey all rigid 
regulations, as ways of  disciplining them. They were really objectified, 
and were made to work in order to afford their lives in prison. However, 
sooner or later the prisoners were aware of  themselves being there, and 
that they no longer felt themselves as mere objects, but subjects of  all 
those strict schedules and regulations. They could even manage to control 
their own guards and all other prison staff. 
In this scenario we also see how people thought of  doing some 
good things to these people. People from different institutions participated 
in doing something for all the prisoners. Not only the particular institutions 
but also different state institutions, particularly those involved in this 
matter, would think of  the many ways they could benefit these people. 
The prisoners were objectified on the one hand, yet, on the other, they also 
had some functions and roles, accepting themselves as subjects that were 
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doing something for other prisoners and all practitioners in prison. They 
were clearly seen in the power relations practiced among the prisoners and 
the practitioners in   prison. This was called a non-discursive formation 
of  the subject. 
In The History of  Sexuality volume 1, Foucault maps out the 
discourse on sexuality from the early 17th century through19th century, and 
saw the deployment of  sexuality which affected the whole population. 
From the beginning of  the 17th century on, sex and sexual acts were 
guarded strictly and were limited at home, in bedrooms, and people were 
not allowed to speak of  them publicly. It was a real taboo. The sin against 
sex was only acknowledged in the confessional table with the confessor, 
who behaved like a psychoanalyst who listened closely to the sex problem 
faced by his client. However, Foucault here does not concern himself  with 
sex and sexual acts, for to him talking about sex was boring.11 He is rather 
concerned with the issue of  sexuality as a cultural construction, of  how 
people talked about it in different cultures and times, how people thought 
of  it, analyzed it, and brought it into discourse.
In this volume, Foucault analyzes sexuality experienced by 
hysterical women from the beginning of  the 17th century to the Victorian 
era, full of  repressive hypotheses. However, as the reaction to this, we 
also experience the glamorous women of  modern times. Sexuality was 
really repressed and could only be carried out with many moral codes and 
demands. To express one’s pleasure of  sexuality, prostitution houses were 
erected, complemented with moral regulations and mechanisms. Men and 
women who came to these houses had to respect all these moral codes 
and regulations. We see here that men and women were still objectified by 
various kinds of  mechanisms developed by institutions. Men and women 
also suffered from psychological problems, and therefore aids came either 
from the state or religious institutions to normalize them. In Christianity 
it was known that these people should be taken care of  through pastoral 
care, for example with the confession to a confessor as the representative 
of  God, who had the right to forgive the sins of  sexuality and other sins 
committed.
Then from the 19th century on, the discourse on sexuality started 
being seen different. Men and women had more freedom to express 
themselves as sexual beings. They felt far freer to do whatever they wanted. 
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The hysterical women were no longer there. Most women expressed 
themselves in a more glamorous way in their speaking and behaving. They 
had more freedom to manage their clothing, take care of  their bodies, and 
relate to other women and men. The women went shopping more often 
to find jewelry or cosmetics or, beautiful clothes; they visited beauty salons 
regularly, taking care of  their hair and skin, to exercise, have massages, 
etc. They would more often shop for groceries to find diets to keep them 
looking beautiful, keep their skin smooth, etc. They did not do this only 
for themselves, but also for men. Of  course, young men, on the other 
hand, would also take care of  their bodies and all their physical and 
psychological needs as well. This was really important as young girls and 
young boys needed each other in a kind of  power relations. Such strategy 
was practiced all the time either by women or men in a mode of  power-
knowledge relation.
All the above mentioned mechanisms would also influence 
the development of  industries, in terms of  economic, social, political, 
psychological and cultural lives as well. We witness in the modern era 
the glamorous life expressed in the way people live, what they wear and 
they behave, enhancing young people’s lives, but also causing concern for 
many. We then ask, “Is that the meaning of  freedom that they achieve 
in their life, or is that something which can ruin them? Do people have 
freedom in their life and work? Do young people experience joy? In all 
these we see the power-knowledge relation intertwined in historical and 
cultural frames.
Foucault’s Last Project: Constitution of  the Self
Foucault’s last philosophical project appears in his The Use 
of Pleasure (volume 2) and The Care of the Self, vol.3),12 and in his many 
lectures, seminars, interviews, and the courses delivered at the Collège the 
Françe shortly before his death. He started discussing about this in1978-
9 and intensified his discussions after 1981-2. In these two volumes he 
elaborates on sexuality as practiced in the classical Greco-Roman period 
from around the 5th century BC to the 2nd century AD. Beside sexuality, 
he also concentrates on the πάρήσίά (parrhesia: truth-telling) which he 
discusses intensively in his last seminars.
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In The Use of  Pleasure, Foucault discusses the problematization 
of  pleasure, concentrating on the aphrodisia, a term understood as acts, 
gestures, and contacts that produced certain form of  pleasure.13 There 
he discloses the aphrodisia known in Plato’s and Aristotle’s works, the 
practice of  sexual acts which enhanced desire that is within human beings, 
as well as gestures and all kinds of  human contacts which are dynamic 
and enhancing. There he also discusses the moral issues emerging from 
the discussion of  the sexual act, reproduction, sexual withdrawal, how 
husband and wife should live their married life, and erotic relations with 
boys, etc. He also discusses dietetics, the ethical practices of  sexuality, 
confession and one’s spiritual management in Christianity, erotic life, etc. 
In brief, I may say that his The Use of  Pleasure discloses various problems 
of  sex in classical Greek thought. 
In The Care of  the Self, Foucault introduces a set of  concepts that are 
absent in volumes 1 and 2. In this book, he concentrates on the issues of  
the cultivation of  the self  through the experience of  desire and pleasure, 
the self  and others, the woman and the body, digging out all classical texts 
that talk about the practice of  the self  as the ethics of  freedom. Briefly 
speaking, this volume analyzes these problems as they appeared in Greek 
and Latin texts of  the first and second centuries AD. By discussing desire 
and pleasure, Foucault wants to show that man is a desiring subject. The 
most important thing seen here is Foucault’s conceptualization of  ethics, 
his theoretical elaboration of  ethics as a framework for interpreting these 
Greek and Roman problematizations of  sex.
In brief, these two volumes concentrate on the issue of  the 
cultivation of  the self. The question asked then is, why sexuality and why 
truth-telling (parrhesia)?. Foucault realizes that the classical Greco-Roman 
practice of  sexuality centered on the subject, who is aware of  him/her 
self  based on freedom and responsibility. In sexuality, people should talk 
about the desire and pleasure which is given and implanted in mankind 
and no body can force it from the outside. Men and women have to be 
open to themselves without any self-delusion and extreme self-love.  All 
moral codes and regulations are to be obeyed and practiced freely and in 
full responsibility. Here we see that people are no longer objectified and 
then made subjects, but how the subject constitutes him- or her- self  in 
the practice of  freedom. Or to put it another way, how the subject relates 
to his/her self  (rapport a soi).
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Foucault’s last project of  thought is centralized on the constitution 
of  the self. And the history of  ancient sex was certainly the history of  
ancient ethics. He argues that our history of  morality should not be 
exclusively focused on the history of  the code of  moral behavior, but 
we must also pay careful attention to the history of  the forms of  moral 
subjectivation, to how we constitute ourselves as moral subjects of  our 
own actions.14 
According to Foucault, ethics as the self ’s relationship to itself  has 
four main aspects: first, the ethical substance which is the part of  oneself  
that is taken to be the relevant domain for ethical judgment; second, the 
mode of  subjection, that is, the way in which the individual establishes 
his or her relation to moral obligations and rules; third, the self-forming 
activity or ethical work that one performs on oneself  in order to transform 
oneself  into an ethical subject; and fourth, the telos, the mode of  being at 
which one aims in behaving ethically.15
It is clear then that in discussing the ethics of  the self  as the 
practice of  freedom, one does not evade from the discussion about the 
governmentality which interested him around 1980-1. We see there the 
intersection between these two themes: the history of  subjectivity and 
the analysis of  the forms of  governmentality. The history of  subjectivity 
begins with the study concentrated on the divisions carried out in society 
in the name of  madness, illness, and delinquency, and then the effects of  
these divisions on the constitution of  the subject. We have also seen that 
the history of  subjectivity tries to locate modes of  objectivation of  the 
subject in scientific knowledge as concerned with language (linguistic), 
work (economics) and biology (life).16
As for the forms of  governmentality that had been of  interest 
since 1977, this analysis responds to a “double objective.” On the one 
hand, Foucault wants to criticize current conceptions of  power, which 
was thought as a unitary system, a critique undertaken thoroughly in 
Discipline and Punish and the first volume of  The History of Sexuality. On the 
other hand, he wants to analyze power as a domain of  strategic relations 
between individuals and groups, relations whose strategies were to govern 
the conduct of  these individuals.17
The last point that Foucault devotes himself  to is the discussion of  
parrhesia or truth-telling (veridiction). This theme becomes the topical point 
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in his seminars at the University of  California at Berkeley, USA entitled 
“Discourse and Truth: The Problematization of  Parrhesia”. Parrhesia is a 
Greek phrase that consists of  two words, namely “pan” which means all 
and “rhesis” or “rhema” meaning expression, what is said, or speech. This 
expression also means the speaking skill, openness, politeness, honesty, 
fairness, and freedom of  speech. Parrhesia in its real meaning is understood 
as the verbal activity to express everything which is in one’s own mind 
(action de tout declarer, tout exprimer). Implicit in the word parrhesia are one’s 
freedom of  speech, one’s relation to truth, one’s bravery of  telling the 
truth as this calls for danger, and also as an obligation and virtue as well.18
The importance of  the discourse on parrhesia is how an individual 
is able to tell the truth to other people, and that what he is telling is 
something that is true. This means that the individual has certain relation 
with truth and therefore he/she should be true either in words or in deeds. 
To reach this step Foucault brings his readers to the issue of  meditation 
and the examination of  conscience in different spiritual exercises, and 
ascetics. All these exercises are kinds of  the practices of  the self  which 
then lead to the care of  the self. Through all these spiritual exercises and 
the examinations of  conscience, the individual could govern him or her 
conduct well, and this also unfolds the mode of  being that one already 
has in his or her life. This is what Foucault calls the art of  existence. Life 
should be seen as a work of  art on how the individual builds up his or her 
self  continually in his or her life. This is what Foucault calls the aesthetic 
of  existence.
The discussion on subjectivity finally reaches the telos of  his project, 
namely the care of  the self. Foucault deliberately brings his readers to the 
classical Greco-Roman period with all their life styles, and he wants to 
show that in antiquity ethics was seen as the practice of  freedom. People’s 
freedom was highly respected and everybody seemed mature in his or her 
own self, in the sense that the individual had a good relation to his or her 
self.
Conclusion
Foucault’s philosophical project finally ends up with his untimely 
death as he was busy working on his last work on the care of  the self. In 
that work, he starts with the analysis of  several historical facts in the past, 
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using the archaeological method, digging more and more information. He 
thus witnesses how the individual (the sick, mentally ill and the delinquent) 
is objectified by the normal and the healthy. However, at the same time, 
the mad man and woman also take him-or her-self  as subject, who has 
some self-respect as he or she has been well taken care of. Here we see that 
there are always power relations working on all different strategies played 
between the abnormal and the normal.
Foucault then moves to the discussion of  power. There he uses the 
genealogical method with his non-discursive practices to find out power-
knowledge relations working in the discourse on criminality and prison, 
as well as on sexuality. He goes through all kinds of  repressive hypotheses 
and sees how the criminals and the hysterical women were treated as 
objects in the beginning, and then they became aware of  themselves as 
subjects taken care of  by others. More than this, the subjects become 
more conscious to their own obligations and embark on taking care for 
others. This can be seen in how the prisoners take up their responsibility 
for all other prisoners by working to earn money for all of  them.
Finally, at the end of  his life he talked much about taking care of  
the self. In the discourse on sexuality, the individual is aware of  him-or 
her-self  as an historical and moral being, that he or she should function 
according to all kinds of  moral codes and prescriptions until he or she is 
finally aware of  him-or her-self  as a desiring subject, who has this given 
grace implanted in him-or her-self. He is then aware of  him-or her-self  as 
a free subject who has the capacity to creatively search for a certain mode 
of  being. 
In terms of  parrhesia, Foucault also goes back to classical exercises 
of  the self  through various practices of  the self  in different historical 
periods, and how the individual develops a relation to him-or her-self. 
Foucault shows here the subject who has a relation with him-or her-self  
through the discourse of  truth. The subject actually has a certain relation 
to truth. This was what the classical Greco-Romans called ethics, which 
was the practice of  freedom. Ethics is something that comes out of  one’s 
own awareness of  him- or her-self  as a social being, how he/she takes care 
for others. Here Foucault also talks about the capability of  an individual 
to govern him-or her-self  well through the governing of  one’s conduct. 
He also claims that if  one is able to govern oneself, one is also supposed 
to be able to govern others. 
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Foucault claims that this ethics as the practice of  the self  should 
come to the ability to build a mode of  being, a lifestyle, or an art of  
existence. Life is seen as a work of  art that needs to be valorized and 
re-evaluated all the time. We never come to a full and precise level of  
maturity. However, one should be aware that human maturity is always 
temporary, fractured and unstable. Therefore, as a work of  art, our life 
needs to be creatively and continually built. We never accept this kind of  
life as something given, but something that needs one’s own creativity and 
continual refreshment. That is the reason Foucault addresses life as an 
aesthetic of  existence.
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